The concept of a justificatory category has to be understood in terms of analogical or theoretical reasoning. A justificatory category comprises claims that arise on the basis of a certain type of justification or underlying principle, so that a justificatory category can play a role in analogical or theoretical reasoning. 10 Take contract as a possible justificatory category. I take it that contract is concerned with claims that arise from the principle that agreements should be observed, or some . This may lead to the assimilation of different rules into a single rule covering matters that were previously understood to be governed by different rules; or it may be used to justify breaking down a rule into two distinct rules. 6 R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998). 7 eg L. Alexander, 'Bad Beginnings' (1996) 145 U Penn LR. 8 For example, Dworkin's approach would appear to leave open the possibility of more radical transformations of the law than the more traditional concept of analogical reasoning as a tool for incremental change. 9 Also, I have not discussed the controversial question whether this process should be understood as finding or making law. 10 Cf 'functional categories' in M. Moore, Placing Blame (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997),18ff.
principle along these lines. 11 There are many types of agreement, but certain types of issue are common to them all, because they are concerned with aspects of this basic arisen, what sort of remedy is appropriate if the agreement is not performed, etc. The recognition of a category of contract, with a uniform framework for the treatment of claims, is a means of ensuring that such issues receive consistent treatment when they arise. Thus there might be a case where a claim is based on agreement but governed by a distinct set of rules using distinct concepts and terminology because historically it has not been recognised as a claim in contract. 12 Characterising the claim as contractual, and thereby revising the rules governing it and bringing it under the uniform framework for claims based on agreement, amounts to developing the law through analogical or theoretical reasoning.
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It seems to me that contract law is a sound justificatory category and is recognised as such. Tort is generally taken to be a justificatory category and I shall refer to it as such. 14 Property law is also in my view a sound justificatory category, as I shall argue below. 15 It could be that a category is recognised and operates as a justificatory category although the nature of the justification behind it is not properly understood or is controversial. 16 Indeed, for any category there is likely to be some disagreement about the nature of its justification. The effect of the classification may not then be as clear-cut as the contractual illustration might suggest. But nevertheless it will determine in general terms how the issue is approached and what types of consideration are considered relevant.
17 11 There is room for different interpretations of this proposition, which can generate arguments concerning particular rules of contract law, but this does not imply that the proposition is not meaningful or that the principle cannot operate in the way suggested. 12 For example, certain equitable doctrines expressed in terms of fraud or unconscionability appear to be actually concerned with reneging on an agreement, eg secret trusts or some cases of proprietary estoppel. 'Equity' is not in my view a justificatory category. 13 A category like contract will for the time being have a conventional or recognised scope that will tend to evolve in the light of analogical and theoretical reasoning. 14 It is a matter of controversy whether there are distinct categories of tort based on distinct types of justification, not reducible to a single more abstract formula. 15 The recognition of these categories as justificatory categories is reflected in a very full theoretical literature offering various theories of the category. 16 It is said that analogical reasoning is 'incompletely theorised', ie, it is a technique for solving a problem without a comprehensive theory: see Sunstein, above n 5, 747; E. Sherwin, 'A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law' (1999) 66 Univ of Chicago LR 1179. 17 One might say instead that a category is defined in terms of a certain type of problem, ie a type of situation involving a certain clash of interests requiring resolution, for which rival solutions might be offered.
For present purposes, the vital question is whether there is a justificatory category of unjust enrichment. The project pursued in Unjust Enrichment -the formation of a single body of law subject to a uniform framework, through analogical or theoretical reasoning -makes sense only if there is such a category. 18 Before considering this question, we need to consider a second type of classification.
Classification by the form of legal relation
Consider a different type of category: the category of all events that constitute a legal wrong. This category can be expressed in another way. A wrong is a breach of duty.
Thus the category can also be expressed as the category of 'right/duty' relations, where the claimant had a right that the defendant act (or refrain from acting) in a certain way, and the defendant breached his duty by failing to do so. For example, X might have a right to contractual performance correlating with a contractual duty on the part of Y; or X might have a right not to be assaulted by Y, and Y a correlative duty not to assault X.
An analogous concept is the concept of a power. X exercises a power where he changes the legal position by doing an act for this purpose. For example, X exercises a power when he terminates a contract with Y or transfers property to Y.
Again, the concept can be expressed either in terms of a legal relation of power/liability -X has a power correlated with a liability on the part of Y to have his legal position altered -or in terms of an act that is specified by reference to the relation, ie, the act of exercising a power.
Right/duty relations and power/liability relations are two of the four types of legal relation identified by Hohfeld, the other two being the 'liberty/no-right' relation and the 'disability/immunity' relation. 19 Hohfeld described his legal relations as 18 Some commentators have been sceptical about classification of this sort. One objection seems to be based on the idea that the law is just about identifying authoritative rules, and the classification of these rules is not generally relevant to solving any legal problem. Another objection seems to be that categories like contract and tort draw on various types of justification and it is unhelpful to differentiate between them along the lines suggested. example, the creation of the contract involves the exercise of a power, but the relation established by the exercise of the power may be a right/duty relation. A classification of this sort according to the type of basic concept in terms of which the rule is formulated might be described as a formal classification.
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There is another type of legal relation that is important for present purposes.
Sometimes a defendant D is liable to compensate the claimant C for a loss, even though the loss cannot be said to have resulted from a wrong by D. An example might be where D is liable to compensate his neighbour C for harm caused by a dangerous thing emanating from D's land. 23 Here D was entitled to keep the dangerous thing on his land, and he is liable irrespective of whether he could actually have prevented its escape from his land. D 'keeps it at his peril', which is to say that D's liability arises from the fact that the harm was caused, irrespective of whether D committed a wrong in keeping the thing or in failing to prevent it from escaping. (Also, clearly one cannot say that the claim arose from the exercise of a power by C. The escape of the dangerous thing or the resulting harm is not the exercise of a power by anyone.) One might say that D has a conditional duty, ie a duty to pay compensation in the event 20 ibid. 21 The classic example arises from the inconsistent usage of the word 'right' to mean both a right correlating with a duty -a 'claim-right' in Hohfeldian terminology -and also a liberty: see Simmonds ibid, xix-xx. For a suggested example of the conflation of the right/duty and power/liability relations, see P. Jaffey, 'Hohfeld's power-liability/right-duty distinction in the law of restitution ' (2004) is better to say that this is a 'strict liability relation': a strict liability relation specifies a causative event that generates a claim by C against D, the event being neither a breach of duty (by D) nor the exercise of a power (by C).
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There is a particular type of strict liability relation that is important for present purposes. This is where the event that generates the claim is not an event that causes harm to C, nor even an act of D, but the receipt of a benefit by D, the claim being for the benefit or its value or some part of it. This category (or sub-category of the strict liability category) might reasonably be described as the category of 'unjust enrichment'. It is a formal category in the sense above, not a justificatory category. It is not defined by reference to any particular justification or underlying principle.
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BIRKS'S CLASSIFICATION
The nature of the classification examples of the exercise of a power, and, described in terms of legal relations rather than events, this is the category of power/liability relations. As discussed above, these categories are not the same as the justificatory categories of contract and tort: some powers (including some private law powers) have nothing to do with contract -for example, the power to transfer property, make a will, or waive a tortious duty.
Conversely, as Birks notes (p 20), contract is also concerned with breaches of duty, which fall within the wrongs category, not the consents category. Consents cannot be even roughly equivalent to contract, nor wrongs to tort.
Birks's 'unjust enrichment' category
What about Birks's category of 'unjust enrichments'? Chapter 1 identifies what is described as the 'core case' of unjust enrichment -the case that is taken to be an indisputable example of unjust enrichment. This is the case of mistaken payment,
where the claimant C has a claim to recover a sum mistakenly paid to the defendant D. Birks defines his category of unjust enrichment as comprising all cases that are 'materially identical' to this core case. 30 This is not sufficient to define the category, however, because there are many different criteria according to which other cases might be taken to be identical to or different from the core case. Birks identifies the following three defining features from which to generalise from the core case to the 29 This seems to be generally assumed by both proponents and opponents. Proponents seem to treat Birks's categories as equivalent to their own categories of contract and tort: see eg A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (London: Butterworths, 2 nd edn, 2003) 1. Cf Hedley, above n 18, 158. 30 3. Also, at 10, unjust enrichment is an event that generates a claim 'by the same logic as explains … the core case' of mistaken payment.
category of unjust enrichment (pp 9-10): first, that D received a benefit; secondly, that the benefit was received 'at C's expense'; and, thirdly, that there is a reason why it would be unjust for D to retain the benefit. Later these become the first three stages of a general 'five stage framework' governing the law of unjust enrichment (p 34). However, as I argued above, the project of developing a new body of unjust enrichment law subject to a common framework, by a process of theoretical or analogical reasoning, calls for a justificatory category of unjust enrichment. And indeed the five stage framework seems to be intended to be analogous to, say, the framework of contract, consisting of issues such as whether there is offer and acceptance, whether there is consideration, whether the agreement has been performed as agreed, etc; or the framework for the law of negligence, consisting of issues such as whether there is a duty of reasonable care, whether there has been a breach, whether the damage is too remote, etc (pp 34-5). But in these cases the framework is plausibly based on the assumption that it governs a justificatory category, and is defensible only on this basis. It appears that Unjust Enrichment identifies and defines a formal category of unjust enrichment and then treats it as a justificatory category; but, as I hope has been made clear, there is no reason to assume that the formal category also happens to be a justificatory category. 33 Below, I shall 31 The fourth stage is whether C's claim is in personam or in rem, and the fifth is whether there is a defence. 32 When the 'unjust' requirement is satisfied, this must mean unjust as between D and C, so the issue really incorporates the 'at C's expense' requirement. 33 Other commentators who adopt broadly the same approach as Birks generally adopt a supposed 'principle of unjust enrichment' which purports to provide the justificatory basis for the category of unjust enrichment, eg Burrows, above n 29, ch 1, but 36 Birks now accepts that claims for the benefit of a wrong are not unjust enrichment claims. (The idea of unjust enrichment as a single category divided between 'autonomous unjust enrichment' and 'unjust enrichment for wrongs' was previously an important feature of his approach and is retained by Burrows, above n 29, 5-6.) 37 There appears to be some confusion here between the category of consent and the category of contract: see below at n 64. 38 At least this appears to be Birks's assumption. In his example the claim arises when the debt becomes payable, not when the loan is made. Receipt by an agent seems a better example for this reason. claim. This will be considered below.
Birks as a formalist
Birks's approach has sometimes been criticised in terms that imply scepticism about the very exercise of legal classification. Reviewing a collection of essays edited by
Birks on the subject of legal classification, Campbell condemns it on the ground that 39 Birks suggests that such a claim is not dependent on receipt and is not for a gain-based measure. But certainly it is much easier to justify the claim on the basis that there is a benefit to D than purely on the basis of D's unsuccessful efforts, and the remedy is like the quantum meruit, which appears elsewhere to be assumed to be restitutionary and gain-based. Another example is receipt of property: see below at n 61. 40 The same confusion of formal and justificatory categories is apparent in the discussion in Chapter 1 of unjust enrichment as the 'tertium quid' (pp 5-9). The traditional common law was divided into contract and tort, and Birks points out that the mistaken payment claim is neither of these, and therefore that it must represent a third category or 'tertium quid'. Contract and tort are justificatory categories, and neither includes the claim for mistaken payment, so there must indeed be a justificatory category outside contract and tort that includes the mistaken payment claim. Birks identifies a formal category into which the mistaken payment claim falls, and he infers that this category is the third justificatory category. But there is no reason to assume that this formal category corresponds to a justificatory category, or, for that matter, that it does not encompass claims in contract or tort -in fact, it does include some contractual claims, as Birks's own discussion reveals.
it is liable to 'carry a highly contentious hidden burden', and that it 'requires the ignoring issues that bring into question the justification behind property law are commonly at stake in ordinary cases, any more than comparable issues are at stake in ordinary contract or tort cases. It means only that these issues lie behind the ordinary rules and 44 A quite different issue concerning unjust enrichment should be mentioned here. In some contexts it may be appropriate for the law not to be rule-based at all, but for the court to apply principles directly, weighing up conflicting principles in a balancing exercise and making a judgment about which should prevail in the circumstances of the case. This may lead to increased uncertainty and unpredictability, but it may also avoid injustice in some cases. It has been suggested that 'unjust enrichment' is such an area of law: see D Kennedy, 'Form and Substance in Common Law Adjudication' (1976) 89 Harv LR 1685, 1688. The traditional objection to the theory of unjust enrichment was that it involved the application of 'personal moral opinion', and this might be understood as a disparaging reference to non rule-based law from a formalist point of view. The modern arguments for the theory of unjust enrichment have often concentrated on responding to this. Such arguments miss the real point, since they do not go to the question whether there is a justificatory category of unjust enrichment at all. 45 Subject to the comment at n 17 above. I would take the justification to be concerned, broadly speaking, with protecting people in respect of the investment of work and resources in creating or improving 'things'. loom large in the occasional case when the recognised rules fail to determine the outcome, ie in some cases where theoretical or analogical reasoning is in play.
46
Property law is sometimes described as the law of 'in rem rights'. This might reasonably be understood to refer to property law as a justificatory category in the sense above. However, an in rem right is often defined as a right that subsists as against an indefinite number of people, as compared with an in personam right, which subsists against a finite number of people. These are formal, not justificatory, categories of legal relation in the sense discussed above, although this formal classification is independent of the formal categories considered above: for example, a power/liability relation can be in personam or in rem, as can a strict liability relation. 47 To say that a right is in rem in this sense does not disclose the nature of its justification, and in rem rights can arise in different justificatory categories. In tort, for example, although a claim for compensation is in personam, the right not to be harmed is in rem, but it is not generally thought to be part of the law of property. In contract, the power to make a contract is in rem because it can be exercised with Birks equates property law with the law of in rem rights, and he understands in rem rights in the standard sense above, ie as rights subsisting against an indefinite number of people (pp 26-34). 49 He argues that a claim cannot properly be said to arise 46 This does not mean that grand issues arise in every case of analogical or theoretical reasoning. 47 There is an ambiguity, since either the right-holders or the duty-bearers can be indefinite in number. 48 Hohfeld, above n 19, 49ff. Hohfeld preferred the expressions 'multital' and 'paucital'. I shall use the traditional expressions. 49 It is true that the expressions 'in rem' and 'proprietary' are often used interchangeably. Often this will not cause any problem, but sometimes it is a cause of confusion. I used 'proprietary' to refer to the justificatory category of property, and in rem in its usual sense, in P Jaffey, The Nature 
THE 'CORE CASE' OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
As discussed above, Birks argues that the claim to recover a mistaken payment is the 53 Including claims to traceable proceeds. This may be stated too narrowly, since there may be other types of claim arising from the claimant's ownership, for example a claim for payment for the unauthorised use of property. I argue for this general approach to restitution and ownership in P. Jaffey, above n 49, and Jaffey, above n 52. 54 I take this to be almost universally assumed: see eg Burrows, above n 29, 9. 55 This seems to be the understanding of the case where title passes even though the transfer is mistaken, because the mistake was not 'fundamental'. It cannot apply to the case where it is said that title is lost because the proceeds are no longer traceable. classification that divides up in this way claims by an owner whose property has been invalidly transferred.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND CONTRACT
As mentioned above, Birks concedes that there are contractual claims that arise from the receipt of a benefit (ie are within the formal category of unjust enrichment), but he excludes these from his category of unjust enrichment, presumably because he conceives of his category as being in the nature of a justificatory category as I have described it. Birks's example is the simple case of a loan, where there is a claim to recover a payment based on contract. 62 By contrast, the case regarded by Birks and many others as a standard case of unjust enrichment is where C paid D a sum in advance of performance of a contract by D, and D did not perform. C may be entitled to recover the prepayment (pp 125-7). 63 But why is this claim not a contractual claim, 59 Which can be in personam or a new and different type of in rem right (pp 32-33). 60 Birks distinguishes between three forms of claim (pp 54-58): the vindicatio and wrongful interference, which are both based on the claimant's having title, although this can be a new title arising from unjust enrichment or a retained title; and the unjust enrichment claim, which the claimant can make where he has no title, but also where he has title but waives it. 61 This is surely an unjust enrichment claim in the formal sense. There is a claim that arises as a result of and on the event of the transfer. 62 See n 37 above. 63 Strictly speaking the claim is available only where there has been a 'complete failure of consideration'.
falling outside Birks's unjust enrichment category, just like the claim to recover a loan?
The thinking here may be that the claim is not contractual because, by contrast with the example of a loan, D did not actually agree to repay the money: he agreed to provide the specified contractual performance. But it is exceptional in contract for the remedy to be for D to do something that he actually agreed to do in the contract. It is true only in the case of claims for payment of an accrued debt or for specific performance. It is not true in the ordinary case of damages, although of course no-one doubts that a claim for damages is a claim in contract. 64 If we look for the justification for C's right to recover his money, it seems quite clear that it lies in contract, in the sense that it arises from the principle underlying the law of contract, even if the precise form of the connection between the principle that agreements should be observed and the right to recover a prepayment is not immediately obvious. 65 Again, one might wish to say that although the claim is contractual in justificatory terms, it is in formal terms an unjust enrichment claim, just as the mistaken payment claim is in terms of its justification a property law claim and also in formal terms an unjust enrichment claim. Just as 'unjust enrichment' provides no distinct alternative justification for the mistaken payment claim, so 'unjust enrichment' provides no noncontractual justification of the claim to recover a contractual prepayment.
'UNJUST FACTORS' AND 'NO LEGAL BASIS'
The 'no legal basis' approach Birks's five stage framework for the analysis of unjust enrichment claims was mentioned above. The important first three stages -that D received a benefit, that it was at C's expense, and that it would be unjust for no claim to arise -emerge from the discussion of the core case of mistaken payment. 66 These three stages are identified from the features of the core case that define the category of unjust enrichment. The most fundamental issues arise in connection with the third stage of the framework, the 'unjust' requirement. In the past Birks has approached this 64 The argument may be that D did not 'consent' to repay the prepayment. On this approach contractual claims are confined to claims to enforce primary rights (p 20). This reflects confusion between consent or exercise of power as an event creating a contract and contract as a category based on the principle that agreements should be enforced. 65 In my view, it is to be explained in terms of the protection of reliance in contract: see Jaffey, above n 49, ch 2. 66 See text at n 31 above.
question in terms of 'unjust factors'. The concept of unjust factors is derived from the concept of vitiating factors like mistake. On the unjust factor approach, these vitiating factors are assimilated with other so-called unjust factors, in particular 'qualified intent', where the claimant made a transfer intending it to be recoverable in the event of some condition not being fulfilled, and also various so-called policy grounds for an unjust enrichment claim. 67 This unjust factor approach has always been contrasted with a rival approach according to which an unjust enrichment claim arises not from one of a number of possible unjust factors, but from the fact that there is an 'absence of basis' or 'no legal basis' for the receipt and retention of the benefit by the defendant. This is said to be the civil law approach. 68 In Unjust Enrichment, Birks has for the first time abandoned the unjust factor approach in favour of the no legal basis approach. This will generally be seen as the most striking development in his thinking, and it will no doubt give rise to much discussion.
One reason why Birks finds the no legal basis approach appealing is that it appears to give unjust enrichment a unity that is lacking in the unjust factor approach, which appears to consist in a miscellany of different grounds for a claim (p 93).
Although he does not put it in this way, to say that the unjust factors are a miscellany is best understood to mean that (as argued above) unjust enrichment claims arising from different unjust factors do not belong in the same justificatory category. 69 (In fact, under the property approach above, vitiating factors -though not Birks's other unjust factors -are unified in this sense in relation to transfers of property: in every case their significance is that they preclude the valid exercise by the claimant of his power of transfer as owner. 70 ) By contrast, in appearing to offer a single unifying formula, the no legal basis approach suggests that unjust enrichment claims do indeed constitute a justificatory category. 71 The question then is whether it is possible to 67 At one time there was also thought to be a fault-based category (p 37). 68 My comments are directed at Birks's version of the no legal basis approach, not at other accounts of the civil law approach to unjust enrichment. 69 One might argue that the unjust factor approach should be understood to be based on a formal category of unjust enrichment as explained above, the different unjust factors or categories of unjust factor representing different justificatory categories. This interpretation casts light on some arguments in the unjust enrichment literature: for example, 'failure of consideration' as an unjust factor meaning non-performance of a contract, and 'retention of title' as an unjust factor justifying a claim to recover property invalidly transferred. But this interpretation does not correspond to the way in which unjust factors are usually understood and applied. 70 Cf Birks's discussion of 'intent-based unjust factors' as different ways in which there might be no legal basis (pp 99-101). 71 Birks says that the no legal basis approach makes unjust enrichment more like contract and less like tort (pp 93-94). He also says that contract is like a 'closely knit family' and tort is like a 'loose provide an account of the no legal basis approach to sustain this. Birks offers a couple of abstract formulations of the no legal basis approach. For example, he says that under the no legal basis approach the question is whether the recipient was entitled to the benefit, as opposed to whether the transfer was vitiated by 'incomplete intent' (or some other factor) (p 88). Also, he says that there is no legal basis where there is no explanation of the benefit known to the law (pp 88-9). These formulations do not seem to me to offer anything in the nature of a distinct principle or type of justification such as to support the argument for a justificatory category. But Birks also offers a more concrete interpretation of no legal basis as 'failure of purpose'; to this we now turn.
'No legal basis' as 'failure of purpose'
According to Birks, there is no legal basis for a receipt by D if it does not achieve C's purpose in transferring it. C's purpose must be understood in terms of its intended legal effect or 'explanatory outcome', such as making a gift, creating a contract or a trust, or discharging a liability (p 90). 72 A standard example of no legal basis as failure of purpose is where C made a payment to discharge a liability that it turns out did not exist (p 89). 73 There is no legal basis because the non-existence of the liability means that C's purpose of discharging a liability was not fulfilled. 74 The traditional English analysis is that the payment was vitiated by mistake. (For Birks, this is the unjust factor approach, but as argued above it should be understood to mean that the vitiating factor -eg mistake -vitiated the owner's exercise of his power of transfer.)
It seems to me unhelpful to say that the reason for the claim is that C's purpose of discharging the liability was not fulfilled. The reason why his purpose was not fulfilled is that it was formed in the light of a mistaken understanding of the situation, and it is surely this mistake that provides the basic justification for the claim. The effect of Birks's approach seems to be to confine recovery for mistake to a federation' (pp 15, 94), which might reflect a sense that contract is a justificatory category and tort a formal category consisting of different torts governed by distinct principles not reducible to a single more abstract principle. 72 90. This appears to be the development of 'qualified intent' (previously described by Birks as 'failure of consideration') into a general basis for unjust enrichment claims. It does not seem to be explained why it is that only purposes formulated in terms of the 'explanatory outcomes' are relevant. 73 The leading case discussed by Birks is Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M&W 54; 152 ER 24. 74 As Birks explains (pp 89-90), it cannot be the simple fact that there was no liability that in itself means that there was no legal basis: for example, it might be that the purpose was to make a gift, and here the absence of a liability would be immaterial.
certain type of basic or fundamental mistake, viz., mistake as to the direct legal effect or 'explanatory outcome' of the transfer. For example, it seems that it would exclude recovery in the ordinary case of a mistaken gift, where C intended a gift but was mistaken about some fact that prompted him to make it (because here a gift was intended and achieved). There is no doubt much to be said for restricting claims based on mistake in some such way. 75 But this does not imply that the claim is not based on mistake. 76 It is not clear whether failure of purpose should be understood as a particular manifestation of no legal basis, or whether it is a general elaboration of the concept, which gives content to the more abstract formulations mentioned above, and is of general application. The former seems to imply that it is in the nature of an unjust factor, but this appears not to be intended (pp 90-91). The latter seems clearly wrong, because there are cases that must come within Birks's category of unjust enrichment but surely cannot be explained in terms failure of purpose. For example, in the case of a payment under duress, it appears that C's purpose is indeed fulfilled, 77 and it is difficult to see how the claim can be explained other than on the basis of a vitiating factor. 78 Also consider the case where C's money is transferred to D without C's authority, ie, by a stranger or by an agent or trustee acting without authority. 79 Here, one cannot say that C's purpose in making the transfer was not fulfilled. On my understanding Birks says that there is no legal basis because C had no relevant purpose at all (p 138). 80 But this does not appear to be an application of the same principle, that a transfer by C is recoverable if C's purpose in making it was not fulfilled. By contrast, this type of case is easily explained as a case where the owner's power of transfer was not validly exercised, by the owner or someone else with authority.
More generally, where C disposes of his money or property to D or does work for the benefit of D, it seems to me very doubtful whether the failure of C's purpose in doing so should in itself provide the ground for a claim. In the absence of an agreement with D, generally C should bear the risk that the purposes he had in mind were not fulfilled. 81 But whether or not there is room for a claim based on failure of purpose in some circumstances, Birks's concept of failure of purpose surely does not provide the basis for a justificatory category of unjust enrichment. (The concept of 'no legal liability' or 'failure of purpose' might be be intended to provide the basis for a justificatory category, but I cannot see a convincing argument to this effect.) If there is indeed no genuine justificatory category of unjust enrichment, the mistake of supposing that there is results in the assimilation into a 81 There is a readily-available mechanism available to C if he is not prepared to take this risk, which is also fair to D -C can make an agreement with D beforehand for D to return the transfer in specified circumstances, or pay for the work. Where the parties cannot be expected to make an agreement, because they cannot communicate or because of mistake, it may be reasonable to allow C to recover for a benefit conferred without agreement, as in cases of necessitous intervention or mistaken services: see Jaffey, above n 49, 77ff. 82 There are a number of other types of situation that Birks addresses in terms of failure of purpose, involving both transfers of money or property to the defendant and work done for the benefit of the defendant, including where C does work for D in the course of negotiations for a contract, and where C makes a payment or does work under a valid contract, or under a void contract, with D: see generally Chapter 6. There has been much controversy over these types of case. For lack of space I shall not discuss them here. As to valid contracts, see the section above on unjust enrichment and contract.
single category of various claims that have quite different types of justification. This is bound to distort the law. It is analogous to the old implied contract fiction, which treated some claims as contractual even though they were clearly not based on the contractual principle that agreements should be observed.
Much of what is regarded as the law of unjust enrichment is concerned with claims to recover invalid transfers of money or property or its value (ie where the transfer was vitiated or unauthorised), and it was suggested above that such claims should be understood as falling within the justificatory category of property (whether the claim is in rem or in personam, and whatever other issues arise, concerning 
